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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
FLORA S. MECHAM, et al 
Plaintiff and Ap·peUee, 
vs. 
ARTHUR R. ALLEN, J. H. ALLEN, 
et al 
Defendants and Appellants. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 7865 
This appeal is from a jury verdict and an order of 
the court denying Defendants Aliens' motion for a 
directed vedict or a new trial. The action was brought 
by Flora S. Mecham, the widow of T~omas Udell 
:Mecham, for damages for the alleged wrongful death of 
her husband and by Flora Mecham and her three minor 
children for their personal injuries, the death and injuries 
resulting from an automobile accident near Bridal Veil 
Falls in Provo Canyon on July 4, 1950. 
The Mechams had left their home in Wallsburg, 
Wasatch County, early on the morning of July 4, and 
had gone down to Provo to watch the Independence Day 
Parade. The accident occurred shortly before noon, as 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
they were on their way back up the canyon to their home. 
Thomas Mecham was driving a 1941 Chevrolet coupe, 
and Mrs. Mecham and the two younger children were in 
the front seat, Linda lying on the seat between Mr. and 
Mrs. Mecham and the baby, Gary, on her lap. The older 
boy, Leonard, was in the back seat. The canyon was very 
heavily traveled that day and cars going up the canyon 
were proceeding in a steady stream. 
The canyon road immediately below Bridal Veil 
Falls is a straight-a-way which culminates in an "S" 
curve to the right just at the base of the Falls. (Exhibit 
"8" is a map and Exhibits "A", "B", "C", "2", "3", 
"11", and "12" are photographs of the scene). The hard 
surfaced portion of the highway is 21 feet wide with 
gravel shoulders of varying widths. The highway was 
divided into two lanes by a solid yellow line with broken 
white lines on either side. Just as the Mecham car was 
entering the curve, it was involved in a collision with a 
1950 Ford Tractor and Trailer unit driven by Arthur R. 
Allen, a son of J. H. Allen, two of the Defendants herein. 
The truck, which was designed and used for hauling 
cattle, had been purchasd new in May, 1950, by Mix 
Johnson, the other Defendant. On June 7, 1950, Johnson 
had agreed to sell the truck to J. H. Allen. Allen paid 
Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000.00) down with the agree-
ment that the balance would be· paid when Allen sold his 
wool in the fall, Johnson to retain title until the purchase 
price was paid in full. Johnson had just acquired an 
insurance policy on the vehicle and agreed to keep it 
in force until the title was transferred. Relying on this, 
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Allen had purchased no insurance on the truck, and 
Johnson's insurer, upon discovering the facts, in June 
1951, withdrew from the defense of the case and has 
denied liability. The Aliens then employed their own 
cotmsel. 
On July 3. 1950, Arthur Allen, accompanied by his 
cousin by marriage, Dale :Mousley, left the Allen farm 
in Draper, Ftah, to take the truck to Wendover where, 
in conjunction with Johnson and others, the Aliens were 
hauling cattle for the Jordan Brothers to the summer 
. range above Hewlitt's Ranch, approximately twenty (20) 
miles East of Heber City, Utah. They picked up the 
cattle and, alternating driving, proceeded to the ranch, 
unloaded the cattle, and were on their way back empty 
to the Allen farm when the accident occurred. 
Other than the occupants of the vehicles involved, 
no creditable witnesses to the accident were produced 
at the trial. Thomas Mecham, the driver of the car, was 
killed, and his widow, the Plaintiff, testified that she had 
been looking out her side of the car and did not see the 
truck until just before the crash. Arthur Allen was 
confined to his bed at the time of the trial with rheumatic 
fever, incurred since the accident, and testified only by 
deposition, which had been taken by Plaintiff as a part 
of the pre-trial discovery procedure. He testified that 
while he was still in the bend, the Mecham car swerved 
at him. He cut the truck off his side of the road and 
"hit the brakes," leaving marks where he left the road. 
The other occupant of the truck, Mousley, was present 
in court and testified that he was not observing the 
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highway particularly and his first sight of the Mecham 
car was as Allen called "Look out" .and swerved the truck. 
As a result of the impact, the left side of the Meeham 
car was demolished. Mecham was killed and Mrs. 
Mecham and the children received injuries. Mrs. Mecham 
had her nose broken and scalp cut. At the time of the 
trial, these had completely mended except f.or a slight 
scar on her forehead which her doctor described as "very 
faint," and s.he complained of headaches and backaches 
when she overworked. The two older children's injuries 
were slight, but the baby, Gary, was seriously injured. 
The occupants of the truck were not seriously in-
jured, but the force of the impact twisted the rear wheels 
of the truck, broke its rear springs and the drive shaft, 
and bent the frame of the trailer and sheared the springs 
on its left rear, locking its wheels (Exhibit "5".) There 
was no damage to the right side of the truck or trailer. 
There was a slight, fresh dent in the rear of the left 
front fender of the truck (Exhibit "13"), but the main 
force of the impact was on the left rear of the truck and 
left side of the trailer. Immediately after the collision, 
the Mecham car was facing diagonally across the road, 
its front end projecting into the lane for down canyon 
traffic with considerable debris in front of it in the down 
canyon lane (Exhibits "1" and "D".) The truck and 
trailer were off the highway below the car with only 
the left front wheel on the hard surfaced portion. The 
investigating officers found gouges in the hard surface 
extending from the debris in the down lane to the point 
where the front end of the automobile came to rest. 
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They al~o found tire burns about four ( -l-) feet North of 
the center line in the down lane extending to the left 
rear of the truck. The gouges are marked "G" on Exhibit 
"S" and the burns "B''. To assist in visualizing the sur-
roundings and accident, we have inserted herein a repro-
duction of the Inap (Ex. 8). 
Counsel for Plaintiff did not cross examine any of 
the investigating officers and presented as part of their 
case in chief as to how the accident happened only 
Flora Mecham, the Plaintiff, \Y. 0. Mecham, her father-
in-law, and Otis L. Ercanbrack, a neighbor from Walls-
burg. On rebuttal, Plaintiff produced one Alfred M. 
Carter, who Plaintiff claimed was not discovered until 
the week end recess of the trial in January, 1952, although 
he had worked all during the period in the same small 
group with Plaintiff's father as a fellow emp1oyee of 
rtah Construction Company at the Geneva Steel Plant. 
Carter purported to have been fishing in Provo Canyon 
the day of the accident and placed the locale of the ac-
cident considerably above the point fixed by all other 
witnesses on both sides. Carter also testified the truck 
was moved after the accident, although the undisputed 
physical evidence was that it could not be moved without 
the use of a wrecker. 
The trial court dismissed the action against John-
son, dismissed Allen's cross complaint against him aris-
ing out of the failure to have insurance on the vehicle, 
denied the Aliens' motion for directed verdict, and sub-
mitted the issues to the jury. The verdict of the jury 
gave $30,000.00 for the death of Mecham, $7,500.00 for 
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the personal injuries to Gary Mecham, $5,000.00 for the 
injuries to Flora Mecham, zero general damages for the 
injuries to Linda and Leonard, and assessed special 
damages in accordance with the prayer of the Complaint 
as amended. 
It is Defendants' position that the undisputed phy-
sical evidence fixed the collision in the Allen lane of 
traffic, and on that ground, Arthur Allen could not have 
been negligent, there being no testimony as to other 
grounds of negligence which could have been a proximate 
cause of the accident. Defendants further contend that 
they were prejudiced by the court's instruction as to the 
presumption of due care on the part of Thomas Udell 
Mecham and that they should have had a new trial, if 
not a directed verdict, because of the surprise testimony 
of Carter and the availability of other evidence to dis-
credit such testimony. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DIRECT 
A VERDICT FOR DEFENDANTS ALLEN. 
A. There is no creditable evidence that Arthur R. 
Allen was negligent. 
B. Thomas Udell Mecham was negligent as a 
matter of law. 
II. THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE 
JURY AS TO THE PRESUMPTION OF DUE 
CARE ON THE PART OF THOMAS UDELL 
MECHAM. 
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III. THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT 
DEFENDANT A NEW TRIAL. 
A. Surprise, or the strange case of Mr. Carter. 
B. N ezcly Discovered Evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DIRECT 
A VERDICT FOR DEF'ENDANTS ALLEN. 
A. There is no creditable evidence that Arthur R. 
Allen was negligent. 
It is Defendants' contention now and was at the 
trial that the undisputed physical evidence in the case 
established that the Mecham car was on the wrong side 
of the road when the collision occurred and that, in con-
formity with the well established rule that oral testimony 
to the contrary must yield to the undisputable physical 
facts, 
Haarstrich vs. 0. S. L., 70 Utah 552, 262 Pac. 
100; 
Lavigne vs. Nelson, (N. H.) 18 At. 2d 832. 
a finding should have been entered that Mecham was 
negligent as a matter of law in being on the wrong side 
of the road. Defendants further contend that there was 
no creditable evidence to submit to the jury of negligence 
on the part of Arthur Allen in the driving of his father's 
truck. 
No one at the trial was an actual eye witness able 
to describe how the accident happened. Flora Mecham, 
the Plaintiff, testified on direct examination as follows: 
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"Q. Did you observe any automobiles coming 
down the canyon just prior to the crash? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you observe the other vehicle involved 
in the crash before the crash occurred? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Will you describe in your words what you 
observed? 
A. Well, I was looking out on the road, rather 
to the side, my side, and a car passed us and 
then I turned and seen this big truck, just 
swaying like that. 
Q. Where was this big truck in relation to the 
highway itself when you saw it~ 
A. Well, it just seemed like it was over on the 
side of the road. 
Q. And did you have an opportunity prior to 
the crash to make any further observations? 
A. No. 
Q. Do you know in what lane of traffic your car 
was immediately prior to the crash and the 
time of the crash? 
A. Yes, I do. 
Q. What lane were you in? 
A. We was in our own lane. 
Q. And in relation to the yellow line which 
divides up canyon from down canyon travel, 
where was this semi-trailer just immediately 
prior to the crash and when the crash oc-
curred? 
A. Well, it seemd to me where I seen it, he was 
over on our side of the road. 
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Q. Do you have any judgment as to how far over 
on your side¥ 
A. Xo, I don't.'' (R. 269~270) 
And on cross examination, Mrs. Mecham testified: 
•'Q. Do you recall what part of the truck you saw 
\Yhen you looked, turned and looked at it just 
before the accident happened¥ I think that is 
the way you testified. Do you recall what part 
of the truck you saw at that time~ 
A. "Tell, that truck was coming and it seemed 
to me like it was coming fast and was sway-
ing so that I couldn't see the whole truck 
itself, like it was standing still, but I could 
see the bed of that truck sway. 
Q. In other words, the thing that you saw at that 
time was a bed and that was right up against 
your automobile at that time, was it~ 
A. No. 
Q. How far was the bed from you at that time, 
Mrs. Mecham~ 
A. I don't know. 
A. And before you made that observation you 
had been looking out the side of the car as 
you were going up the canyon~ 
A. Looking out my window on my side. 
Q. And then you turned around and saw the bed 
of the truck and the accident happened almost 
simultaneously. Isn't that right~ 
A. Yes." (R. 278.) 
Taken together, her testimony was that she was 
looking out her side of the car, just before the collision 
she looked to the left, saw the bed of the trailer swaying, 
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it "seemed like it was over on the side of the road", and 
the accident happened almost simultaneously as she saw 
the truck. Whether in reconstructing a flash observation 
some year and one-half later, she gave the impression 
she thought must have happened to place blame on a· 
party to a collision in which her husband was killed and 
she and her family injured, or whether a 45-foot truck 
and trailer in negotiating the curve would seem to be 
swaying to her side, we cannot tell, but certainly the flash 
observation and the limited opportunity she had to ob-
serve is not substantial evidence upon· which the issue of 
negligence on the part of Arthur Allen may be submitted 
to a jury. 
Seybould vs. Union Pacific, ______ Utah ______ 239, 
Pac 2d 174. 
The only other witness produced by Plaintiff who 
purported to testify as to the events immediately pre-
ceding the collision was one Otis L. Ercanbrack who was 
a neighbor of the Plaintiff and her famliy in Wails burg, 
Utah. Ercanbrack was also returning to his farm in 
Wallsburg after the parade in Provo. He was driving an 
F·3, 3t4 ton Ford truck (R 234), and was fourth in line up 
the canyon behind the Mecham car (R 243). He could 
see no better in the truck that he could in an ordinary 
passenger car (R 235). When· he crossed the bridge just 
below the scene of the accident (Exhibit 17), he was 
going 35 miles per hour (R 236) and the cars were about 
bumper to bumper or 3 feet apart going up the canyon 
(R 247). Until the accident, he did not slow down (R 244). 
He testified as to the how the accident happened as 
follows: 
10 
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"Q. vVill you describe n1ore in detail, Mr. Ercan-
brack, this truck that was coming down the 
canyon' 
A. 'Vell-
Q. And that was involved in the accident, of 
course' 
A. As I remember it, there was an old Chev, 
car or else a Ford, I don't know which it was, 
a two-passenger car, coming ahead of the 
truck and the truck came down and he was 
evidently passing him. 
~Ir. Hansen: Well--· 
A. And as he got down close to where the col-
lision happened, the other old-the Chev. car 
or Ford, whichever it was-they passed on 
and he throwed his engine, and of course, he 
kind of turned out on the other side of the 
road. Then this here collision happened. That 
car come up just as hard as it could come. 
Well, it was the traffic, and it just happened 
that quick." (R. 237 -238) 
And as follows on page 239 of the Transcript: 
"Well, the Mecham car. About that time I 
thought I could get by it and I pulled out to the 
right and I went right up to the side after he hit 
and I pulled up to the side and I see I couldn't 
get through. So he hit the car and went right up 
under the back wheels. Right under the truck, 
under this here trailer-truck, and then the drivers, 
it seemed like they had, they backed up three 
times and lossened the loose end quite a bit and 
then· there was an old gray headed gentleman, 
quite elderly man, he come up to me and asked me 
if I would go out, if I would get out of the road; 
I had pulled up too close, and I told him I would 
11 
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get out if I could and he says, 'We'll make room 
for you' and they had at that time gotten the 
truck off Tom's back and by that loosened the 
truck up when he shoved it back, tried to back up. 
They had gotten Tom's truck back; that was right 
to the corner of the truck, so they could get Tom 
out and they got him out and laid him down by 
the cement road there and the car was a little bit, 
was about like that shape and this old gentleman, 
he got some other man and just shoved around 
about two feet and then he let me go out and I 
just missed the stump and went out on over here. 
That is about all I, I left then and went on home." 
And at page 246, on cross examination, he said: 
"Q. Did you see the truck coming around the 
curve in the canyon there, the curve where 
the accident occurred~ 
A. Well, just up, about seventy five feet, or 
something like that. 
Q. Well, was the truck coming around the curve 
when you first saw it; before it collided with 
the automobile~ 
A. When I first saw the truck he was going to 
pass this old Chev car. 
Q. I know, but where was the truck then with 
reference to the curve in the highways ahead 
of you~ 
A. Abont seventy five feet up the road. 
Q. Around the curve~ 
A. Oh just ahead of us there. The curve came 
around like that. The road was so bad you 
couldn't have seen it much further; seventy 
five or one hundred feet. 
Q. Is it your testilnony you could see the truck 
12 
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passing this car seventy five feet up-canyon 
fr01n the curve? Is that your testimony~ 
A. \Yell, where the accident took place. That is 
my testimony. When he seen these cars in 
front the the truck evidently, the way it 
looked to me, pulled his truck across and 
engine across the side of the road. 
Q. I thought you told us in your direct examina--
tion he had completely passed this car~ 
A. K o, I didn't tell you anything of the kind. He 
got his cab across, past over the line and that 
is when the Mecham car hit him. 
Q. \Yell, do I understand you to say the tractor 
part, or the cab part of the truck was over 
on the right side of the road~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Over the center line~ 
A. It just got over the center line and then 
they hit. 
Q. And the trailer was still back over the center 
line~ 
A. Yes sir." 
And at page 248-249: 
"Q. Let me stand right over here and then every-
body can see everybody here. Now Mr. Ercan-
brack, if the tractor, or the cab part, as you 
de signa tea, of the truck was on the lane 
of traffic for down, that is for westbound 
traffic, and if the trailer of that unit was over 
on the lane of traffic for up-canyon that would 
require a very sharp turn on the part of that 
. unit, would it not, to get the truck in that 
position~ 
A. Well, not the way that I looked at it because 
13 
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this here old Chev car moved out of his way 
and he slowed up a little, he immediately 
slowed up and started to turn out of the road 
but he didn't get off quick enough and Tom 
come along and hit,him. 
Q. Then your testimony is that the truck unit 
was coming down the curve on the wrong side 
of the road trying to pass this old car¥ Is 
that what you saw¥ 
A. Yes sir. That is my testimony. That is the 
way I saw it." 
Ercanbrack further testified that he could stop his 
car within a foot when going 35 miles per hour (R. 245); 
that the Mecham car and the Allen truck stopped right 
at the point they came together (R 250); that the truck 
backed off the Mecham car (R 239, 249); and that a 
group of by-standers "as thick as flies" lifted up the 
truck and trailer weighing 8% tons (Exhibit "16") and 
pulled the Mecham car back from under it (R 241, 242, 
251). 
Of course, each of those latter statements is a 
physical impossibility. Anyone knows that a car going 
35 miles per hour cannot be stopped- in one foot. The 
vehicle would travel approximately 51 feet during the 
reaction time and substantially twice that far after the 
brakes were applied.,. Nor would the car and truck 
have stopped right at the point they came together. The 
truck and trailer weigh 8% tons empty (Exhibit "16") 
and were going 30 miles per hour (R 304) just before the 
accident. The car weighed a little over llf2 tons (Ex-
hibit "15") and was going 35 miles per hour at the time 
14 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of the accident if it was at the head of the column in 
which Ercanbrack was traveling at that speed~ Under 
such conditions, the vehicles would not stop as they came 
together. Either the truck would drag the car or the 
car would be thrust back from a point of impact by the 
additional weight of the truck. Nor could a group of 
men lift a trailer, weighing at the rear end, 5,760 pounds 
(Exhibit "16") and drag the Chevrolet out from under. 
N" or could a truck with its drive shaft broken back up 
under its own power (See Exhibits "5" and "6"). 
It is submitted that the other testimony of Ercan-
brack is equally incredible and not capable of belief. 
First, as to his ability to see. By his own testimony he 
was traveling 35 miles per hour, fourth in a column of 
cars approximately 3 feet behind the car in front of him. 
How much would he see of events seventy-five feet up 
thioroad when his attention at that speed and under those 
crowded conditions necessarily would be on the vehicle 
directly ahead~ And if he had been looking, how much 
could he see~ Plaintiff's Exhibits "A", "B", and "C" 
indicate clearly the limited visibility from the area in 
which Ercanbrack must have been when the accident 
occurred. They show that one could not see a vehicle any 
farther up canyon that the vehicle shown in Exhibit "11" 
which is in the same position as the vehicle in Exhibit 
"C" (Compare the bushes at the right of the gate in each 
picture). Nor could he have been any closer to the 
scene than the point where the photograph (Exhibits 
"A", "B" and "C" were taken. Ercanbrack testified 
he did not apply his brakes until the accident. If the 
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cars were as close together as he described, they would 
have all telescoped when the Mecham car hit the truck. 
There is no evidence any such thing happened. Ercan-
brack would have travelled fifty feet from the time he 
was aware of the collision until he applied his brakes 
and another 100 feet to stop. In addition, there were 
two cars between him and the Mecham car or a total 
of 32 feet; so that he was over 180 feet from the curve 
when the collision occurred. Similarly, the truck. was at 
least another 44 feet above the point where the brake 
marks first appeared, that being the distance traveled 
at 30 miles per hour during the reaction time of Arthur 
Allen. Both the brake marks observed by W. 0. Mecham 
(R 128) and those observed by investigating officers 
(R 323, Exhibit "8") were above the location of the 
Mecham car. Therefore, Ercanbrack was at least 220 
feet from the truck when the collision was imminent and 
he could not have observed the truck attempting to pass 
a black "Ford or Chev" as he testified, around the curve 
where it must have been. Even Ercanbrack admitted that 
you could not see over seventy-five or a hundred feet 
from the curve (R 246). Exhibit "2" clearly shows how 
limited is the visibility around the curve looking up 
canyon. 
Secondly, as to what he says he saw, Ercanbrack 
testified that the truck attempted to pass a car traveling 
down canyon ahead of it, observed the Mecham car, 
atte~pted to pull over, got the front of the truck out of 
way, leaving the trailer three-fourths over in the Mecham 
lane, (R 240). But the first point of impact was the 
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rear of the left front fender (Exhibit "13"). If the trac-
tor was cutting back into its own lane, as Ercanbrack 
claimed, leaving the trailer in the wrong lane, the 
Mechan1 car could not haYe creased the fender in the 
manner shown in Exhibit "13". The first impact would 
have been to the rear of the cab, not on the front fender. 
Nor would anyone be likely to drive in the manner 
described by . Ercanbrack. All agree the canyon was 
crowded with holiday traffic. Would anyone with the 
slightest regard for his own safety attempt to pass a 
car on a blind curve under such conditions of traffic? 
Yet, that is the story neighbor Ercanbrack tells. It is 
striking that Ercanbrack, who was the third car behind 
Plaintiff, is the only purported eye-witness produced by 
plaintiff. White, the occupant of car No. 4 admitted he 
did not see anything but commotion (R 173). What hap-
pened to the occupants of cars No. 1 and 2? Plaintiff's 
diligence produced the mysterious fisherman who had 
been working all the time with Plaintiff's father, but 
that diligence failed to produce any real eye-witness. 
W. 0. Mecham, father of Thomas U. Mecham, the 
deceased, also testified as to some tire marks (R 127) 
which he placed on his drawing (Exhibit 17) on the turn 
just over the center line, although only a few months 
before he had testified on deposition that he had seen 
no brake marks, tire marks or debris (R 141-42) and made 
no attempt to correct that statement in his deposition 
when he signed it (R 143). He also admitted (R 144) 
that his testimony as to marks was based on his obser-
vation and discussion with his attorneys at the scene 
17 
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of the accident in the late fall of 1950. 
On the basis of the foregoing testimony, Defendants 
contend that the issue of the negligence of Arthur Allen 
should not have been submitted to the jury. Mrs. Me-
cham had only a flash before the collision and could not 
have observed how it happened or where the truck was. 
Ercanbrack's testimony is so incredible as to be incapable 
of belief, and W. 0. Mecham's testimony as to tire marks 
was, by his o'Yn admission, discredited. As was stated 
by this Court in 
DaUey vs. Midwestern Dairy Products, 80 Ut. 
331, 15 Pac 2d 309. 
"Where the evidence relied upon by Plaintiff 
to establish some 1naterial issue of this alleged 
cause of action is apparently impossible of being 
true in light of facts which are established beyond 
controversy, then and in such case, it becomes the 
duty of the Court to take the cause from the 
jury and deny Plaintiff the relief prayed." 
B. Thomas U deU Mecham was negligent as a mat-
ter of law. 
The testimony of the investigating officers of the 
Utah Highway Patrol, Evans and Clark,.as to the physi-
cal facts they found, testimony not even attempted to 
be attacked by the Plaintiff by cross examination or 
otherwise leads but to one conclusion : The Mecham car 
was on the wrong side of the road when the collision 
occurred. Under such circumstances that is negligence 
as a matter of law. 
Sections 57-7-120, 57-7-121, and 57-7-171, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1943, as amended. 
18 
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Staton rs. Trcsteru Jlacaruui lllanllfadllrin.r~ 
ComJ)(Ul.lf, 52 Ftah -l-:2(), 17-l- Pac. 821. 
Turrietta rs. 1r.lfcl1c, (N.l\lex) 212 Pac 2d 1041; 
Jones rs. Cary. :219 Ind. :2()8, 37 NE 2d 944. 
Evans, the officer in charge, placed the truck about 
72 feet down the road, off the highway on the right-hand 
side directly under a tree (Exhibit "8"), and the Mecham 
car on the South side of the front extending into the 
middle of the road (R 323 and Exhibit "8"). With respect 
to tire burns, Evans testified as follows: (R 323) 
"Q. And will you describe the position of the tire 
burns with reference to the truck and the 
hard surface as to where they were on the 
highway¥ 
A. The tire burns started about four foot north 
of the center line. 
Q. Now in which lane of traffic would that be, 
Officer~ 
A. That would be in the lane of traffic for the 
automobiles moving down the Canyon. 
Q. That would be the lane of traffic ·for down 
canyon traffic~ 
A. That's right. 
Q. And then where did they go, if anywhere~ 
A. They extended to a point ·to the rear of the 
· truck that was off on the north side of the 
road." 
He stated with respect to debris and gouges as follows: 
(R 323-24) 
"Q. Now did you see any other marks upon the 
highway in the vicinity of the point where 
those tiremarks began~ That is, where they 
began up canyon from the truck~ 
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A. Yes, There were some, a lot of debris there. 
There was some gouges in the oil surface and 
the gouges extended to the point where the 
automobile came to rest." 
Both these tire marks and gouges are shown drawn 
by Officer Evans extending to the truck and the car 
respectively (Exhibit "8", R 330). Evans further des-
cribed the damage to the truck and trailer as follows: 
"Q. Well, I am coming to that, Your Honor. I 
will withdraw that question at this time and 
ask you to describe generally the damage to 
the truck as you remember it~ 
A. The front wheels of the, the rear wheels of 
the tractor was knocked out, the spring hang-
ers on the tractor was broken, the drive shaft 
was down, the tractor part. The rear wheels 
of the trailer was knocked out, turned so 
they weren't tracking. The spring hanger 
on the rear trailer was down." (R 333-34) 
Officer Clark testified substantially to the same effect 
as did Evans and further testified that there were no 
other car burns or brake marks above or below the marks 
described (R 346-47). As with Evans, the Plaintiff 
did not cross examine Clark. 
Leo Hales, service manager of Naylor Motor Com-
pany in Provo, who was called to remove the vehicles, 
also testified that the drive wheels of the truck were 
sheared out from the truck, the driveshaft broken, and 
the wheels of the semi-trailer sheared off and locked 
(R 403) so that neither the tractor nor the trailer could 
be moved without a wrecker and another tractor. No 
attempt to discredit his description of the physical con-
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dition of the tractor was Inade by counsel for Plaintiff. 
It is submitted that tbis undisputed physical evi-
dence establishes that the impact occurred in the Allen 
lane of traffic. The gouges running for a distance of 
eight feet to the front end of the Mecham car from a 
point four feet into the Allen lane conclusively show that 
Mecham car must have been four feet into the wrong 
lane when the impact knocked the frame of the .car off 
its axle (Exhibit "D") and made the gouges as the car 
was thrown back. Similarly, the tire burns running to 
the left rear end of the trailer( Exhibit "8") show that 
the truck was four feet inside its lane when the impact 
broke the wheels and set the brakes, causing the burns. 
Only recently this Court has recognized the doctrine 
that undisputed physical evidence overcomes oral testi-
mony. 
Moser vs. Zion Co-operative Mercantile Insti-
tute, 197 Pac 2d 136. 
And other Courts have applied the principle in cases 
where the facts were quite similar to the case at bar. 
That principle was stated by the New Hampshire Court 
Ill 
Lavigne vs. Nelson, Supra. 
as follows: 
"Although ordinarily it is the province of the 
jury to resolve conflicts in oral testimony, here 
the Inferences to be drawn from the undisputed 
location of the marks on the highway, from the 
appearance of the sedan and the truck, and from 
the admitted measurements so decisively demon-
strate the collision occurred on the East side of 
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the road, that all testimony to the contrary must 
be rejected. It is a well-established rule that 
oral testimony must yield to indisputable physical 
facts." 
In that case involving a collision between a truck and 
an automobile, all the passengers of the automobile testi-
fied that their car was on the right side of the road, and 
that none saw the truck until just before the collision. 
Yet, the physical evidence was that dual tire marks were 
on the shoulder of the truck's side of the road, gouge 
marks on the truck's side of the center lane and scuff 
marks of the car ran from the gouge marks to the posi-
tion of the car after _the collision. On that basis, the 
Court directed a verdict for the Defendant. 
The Tenth Circuit, in a case strikingly like this case, 
Chambers vs. Skelly Oil Company, 87 Fed. 2d 
853, 
had the following fact situation before it: 
The accident involved a collision between a truck and 
a trailer weighing between 17 and 18 tons and being 
between 35 and 40 feet in length and an automobile 
weighing about 2900 pounds. They were proceeding in 
opposite qirections. The driver of the truck testified 
that the car approached the place of the accident about 
70 miles and hour on hfs side of the road. Just before 
the accident, the car turned to the truck's side, swerved 
back to the other side and then turned back to the truck's 
side of the road and collided with the left front end of 
the truck. The truck had been on the South half of the 
road traveling at a speed of 32 to 33 miles an hour. When 
he observed the car turning toward his side of the road, 
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he slowed down the truck and turned it off the oiled rna t 
toward the ditch on the side of the highway. The driver 
of the auton1obile testified that he was driving about 
-15 miles an hour. that the truck swerved over into his 
side of the highway about three or four feet over the 
center line. He thought the truck would get back to his 
side ·of the road and turned his car over as far as he 
could on his side of the road as possible. A number of 
disinterested witnesses, including the investigating of-
ficers and highway workers, found the front end of the 
truck in the ditch off on the side of the highway and the 
coupe in the center of the road, the rear of the truck 
headed toward the opposite direction. They were able 
to trace the tracks of the truck back for a distance of 
fifty feet from the rear end of the truck. The right wheel 
tracks were off the mat on the soft shoulder of the road 
and the left wheel on the South half of the mat. The 
shoulder was soft and the tracks were plain. They indi-
cated the truck had gradually pulled over to the South 
edge and off the mat. They also found tracks of the 
coupe where it skidded to the South edge of the oiled 
mat and back toward the center and up to the point of the 
collision. They found broken glass along the side· of the 
road scattered over the oiled mat. They also observed 
some holes freshly gouged in the oiled mat about half-
way between the center line and the South edge of the 
mat and opposite the cab of the truck. Photographs 
of the coupe taken after the accident, indicated nearly 
all the left half of the front of the coupe collided with 
the truck. On the basis of this evidence the Tenth Cir-
cuit Court said: 
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"The rule is likewise settled that when the 
testimony of a witness is positively contradicted 
by the physical facts, neither the Court nor the 
jury can be permitted to credit it (citing cases). 
The tracks, scars in the pavement, broken glass 
and other physical facts show beyond doubt that 
the truck was on the South side of the road and 
the coupe swerved or skidded from the side of the 
road and collided with the truck on the South side 
of the road. That a 2900-pound automobile travel-
ing 45 miles per hour, colliding with a 17-ton truck 
would knock the truck from position four feet 
North of the center line across and off the pave-
ment on the South side is unreasonable. Had the 
collision occurred, as Chambers testified, on the 
North side of the oiled mat, it is reasonable to 
assume that the light coupe would have been 
hurled into the ditch on the North side and not 
the heavy truck into the ditch on the South side. 
It is undisputed that the coupe remained on the 
oiled mat after the collision." 
On that basis, the Court concluded that the trial 
court did not err in directing the verdict for the truck. 
See also 
Schultz vs. General Casualty Company, (Wise.) 
288 N. W. 803, 
to the same effect. 
So in the case at bar the brake marks, gouges and 
positions of the vehicles establish, without doubt, that 
the collision occurred in the Allen lane of traffic. There 
can be no dispute that the gouges leading to the Mecham 
car were made by it when thrust back by the force of 
impact. There can be no doubt that the brake marks 
were made by the Truck after the impact locked the 
rear wheels. There can be no doubt that a collision be-
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tween a 9 ton truck and an ordinary passenger car in 
the south lane of traffic would not throw the heavy truck 
to the north side of the road and leave the passenger 
car to the north of the point of impact, but would have 
exactly the opposite result. There can be no doubt that 
the Mecham car was at least 4 feet north of the ·center 
line when the collision occurred. 
II. THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING 
THE JURY AS TO THE PRESUMPTION OF DUE 
CARE ON THE PART OF THOMAS UDELL 
MECHAM. 
The Court, in its Instruction No. 11, instructed the 
jury as follows : 
"You are instructed that, until the contrary 
is proven, there is a presumption that the ·de-
ceased, Thomas Udell Mecham, was exercising due 
and proper care for the protection of his person 
and the preservation of his life, at the time of 
the accident; this presumption arises from the 
instinct of self preservation and the disposition 
of man to avoid personal harm. This presumption 
is not conclusive, but is a matter to be considered 
by the jury in connection with all other facts and 
circumstances in the case in determining whether 
or not the deceased, Thomas Udell Mecham, was 
guilty of contributory negligence at the time of 
the accident." (R 55) 
The giving of this instruction constituted prejudicial 
error in two respects. 
In the first place, it does not correctly state the law 
as to the presumption of due care on the part of the 
deceased. The court's instruction state: "Until the con-
trary is proven." As this Court only recently has pointed 
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out, the presumption of due care on the part of a decedent 
merely "places on the opposing party the burden of going 
forward with the evidence or of making a prima facie 
case on that issue." 
Tuttle vs. Pacific Intennountain Express Co., 
________ Utah ____________ , 242 Pac 2d 764. 
The instruction, as given by the Court below, re-
quired Defendants to prove, apparently by the prepon-
derance of the evidence, that Thomas Udell Mecham was 
not exercising due care in ihe operation of the Chevrolet 
automobile before the presumption would disappear. In 
·the Tuttle case, this Court held that an instruction as to 
the existence of the presumption of due care "in the 
absence of evidence to the contrary" was confusing where 
there was such evidence. Here the requirement of the 
instruction is affirmative proof, not merely of presenting 
some evidence. As stated by Mr. Justice Wolfe, in the 
Tuttle case, as to the required burden of Defendant with 
respect to this presumption. 
"The 'required burden' as used in the quoted 
sentence, I assume, is not that of satifying a par-
ticular quantum of proof or of introducing enough 
evidence to satisfy the jury that the pr~sumption 
or presumptive fact is overcome. The burden is 
only that of going forward. If this is kept in 
mind, I see nothing wrong with that particular 
statement. Then it is for the Court to determine 
whether the 'opposing party' has gone forward 
by introducing some evidence of how the accident 
happened, but if so, it does not need to be suf-
ficient evidence to satisfy the jury or fact finder 
that the presumption has been overcome, but only 
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some evidence as to how the accident happened." 
(242 P. 2d 764, 773.) 
Secondly, the giving of any instruction with respect 
to the presumption was prejuidicial error, as the De-
fendants more than met their burden of going forward 
with evidence. As said by this court in the Tuttle case, 
"The -ordinary presumption merely places on 
the party claiming the non-existence of the pre-
smnptive fact the burden of producing evidence 
from which the fact trier could reasonably find 
the non-existence of such fact. In other words, 
it plaees on the opposing party the burden of 
going forward with the evidence or of making a 
prima facie case on that issue. If the opponent 
fails to meet this burden the presumptive fact 
should be assumed and the jury should be so 
instructed if the facts on w:hich the presumption 
is based is established, but if the required burden 
is satisfied by the opponent the presumption dis-
appears and the facts must be established from 
the evidence the same as though no presumption 
1 . were ever involved and it is not proper in such 
case to even mention in the instructions the exis-
tence of such presumption. This court has many 
times held that such is the effect of presumptions 
generally and of this presumption in particular." 
(Emphasis supplied.) 
In the case at bar, there was the uncontested physical 
evidence, outlined above, that the Mecham car was on 
the wrong side of the road. In addition, there· was. the 
testimony of Arthur Allen, the driver of the truck, that 
the Mecham car, when the two vehicles were about 35 
or 40 feet apart, suddenly changed its course around the 
curve, came across the line to his side of th~ highway, 
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and came at him "headon." (R 365). On that basis, there 
was more than a prma facie case that Thomas Udell 
Mecham was not exercising due and proper care for the 
protection of his person and the preservation of his life, 
and on the contrary was creating an almost certain risk 
of head-on collision. Under such circumstances, it is not 
proper to even mention in the instruction the existence 
of such presumption as the Court's Instruction No. 11 
delineated. 
In re Newell's Estate, 78 Utah 463, 5 P. 2d, 
230; 
Tuttle vs. Pacific Intermountain Express Co., 
Supra. 
In the Tuttle case, the mention of the presumption 
in such circumstances was stated to be not prejudicial 
because the court "merely instructed that there was a 
presumption in the q,bsence of evidence to the contrary." 
But not so in this case. Here the jury were told the pre-
sumption existed until the contrary was proven, and the 
presumption was to be considered along with all the other 
facts and circumstances in the case. Here the jury was 
not told the cloak of the presumption was sluffed off and 
disappeared with a production of evidence as to how or 
why the accident happened, but was instructed that it 
was an element to be considered along with the other 
facts and circumstances. In other words, the presumption 
was evidence. Such is not the law in this State. 
Tuttle vs. Pacific I nterm.ountain Express Co., 
Supra; 
In re Newell's Estate, Supra; 
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Ryan rs. Union Pacific Railway Comp·any, 46 
Utah 530, 151 P. 71. 
In· the Ryan case, the Utah Court stated the law 
with respect to this presumption as follows : 
"In the absence of evidence there is a pre-
sumption that the deceased used due ·care and, 
for his protection, did all that reasonably was 
required of him. Had the court charged that and 
stopped, the charge would not have been erron-
eous. When, however, facts and circumstances 
are proven to show just what the deceased did, or 
failed to do, then his care, or the want of it, is 
to be determined, not on the presumption, but 
upon the facts and circumstances proven. That 
is, whenever the facts or circumstances are shown 
concerning which the presmnption is indulged, 
the presumption ceases, and the controversy is to 
be decided by the weight of the evidence adduced. 
That is not what the court charged. As charged, 
the jury permitted to cast the presumption on 
the scales and to consider and weigh it with the 
proven facts and circumstances. There is a pre-
sumption of sanity, but when evidence respecting 
the sanity or insanity of the person whose mental 
condition is the subject of inquiry is adduced,. 
the presumption, except as it bears on burden of 
proof, is spent and the controversy is to be de-
cided on the weight of the evidence adduced. 
There, as here, the presumption calls for evidence; 
but when it· is adduced the controversy must. be 
decided on the evidence, not on the ·presumption. 
Here the court, regardless of what facts were 
proven as to the deceased's conduct, in effect 
charged that the presumption itself .'was evidence 
to be considered in connection with the proven 
facts. That was wrong." 
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The court's charge here was no "handkerchief over 
the blanket," but a whole new suit of clothes furnished 
after Defendant's evidence as to how the accident must 
have happened, stripped Plaintiff of the presumption's 
raiment. 
III. 'rHE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT 
DEFENDANT A NEW TRIAL. 
A. Surprise, or the stange case of Mr. Carter. 
It has been observed by courts and commentators 
that one purpose of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, upon which our own rules are based, was to 
eliminate the element of surprise and concealment from 
the trial of law suits. 
I Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Practice and 
Procedure, Section 137. 
Surpri~e, which ordinary prudence could not haYr 
guarded against, is a ground for new trafunder Rule 59. 
It is submitted that Defendants were the unwitting vic-
tims of a carefully prepared and executed surprise. 
Plaintiff rested late on the afternoon of Friday, 
January 25, 1952, after nearly two full days of testimony 
(R. 302). Defendants put on one preliminary witness to 
,identify the map (Exhibit 8) and certain photographs 
(Exhibits 2, 3, 9, 10, 11 and 12) and the Court then 
recessed for the week end (R 318). On the following 
Monday afternoon, Defendants Allen rested (R 422). 
Thereupon, Plaintiff presented as a purported rebuttal 
witness one Alfred M. Carter, who testified he was fishing 
in Provo Canyon the day of the accident. He stayed at 
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the scene only five or six minutes and did not talk to any-
one or see anyone he knew (R. 438). By a curious coinci-
dence, he did not see or talk to anyone about the accident 
until a year and a half later when on the Saturday night 
after the Plaintiff had rested, he was visited by Mr. L. S. 
McCullough, one of the attorneys for Plaintiff (R 425-26). 
Yet all during the intervening period between the ac-
cident and the time of Mr. McCullough's visit, he had 
been working in close association with one Simnwns, 
father of Plaintiff, in a group of Utah Construction em-
ployees at the Geneva Steel Plant (R 81). 
Defendant J. H. Allen came into the case in June, 
1951, when the insurance company withdrew and the 
amended complaint was filed~ His counsel were handicap-
ped by a year's delay in investigation, but used their 
utmost diligence and all their discovery rights under the 
Rules of Procedure to ascertain all they could about 
the case. Interrogatories were served on Plaintiff ask-
ing the names of the witnesses (R 11-12). Plaintiff re-
plied with a "weaseling" answer naming some, but ex-
pressly excluding those known to her attorneys, her 
father-in-law or her brother-in-law. (R 13) Defendants 
were then forced to secure· a court order directing Plain-
tiff to furnish those names she had excluded (R 21). The 
supplemental answer (R 22) named Ercanbrack and 
White, two of Plaintiff's principal witnesses at the trial 
of the action, as the eye witnesses, but did not mention 
Carter. Defendant then took the deposition of the father-
in-law, W. 0. Mecham, to learn more about the identity 
of the witnesses (R 482). He was asked about each of 
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the witnesses named in the answers to the Interroga-
tories, and on page 67 of his deposition, Line 22, there 
appears the following: 
"Q. Who is William White~ 
A. He's a fellow from-I don't know whether 
that would be the steel plant, called the steel 
plant, or would be on the Springville road. 
He works in Provo." 
Now William White did live on the Springville road 
(R 190), and Mr. Carter did work at the steel plant. 
Thus, it is apparent that W. 0. Mecham knew of an eye-
witness who worked at the steel plant, and Plaintiff's 
father must have known. Any person who had been a 
witness to an accident in which a man was killed and 
others were seriously injured, would be likely to discuss 
the matter with his fellow employees. It is stretching 
incredulity that Plaintiff's father, Simmons, did not hear 
oi Carter's connection with the accident if, in fact, he 
had been there. Yet despite the court's order that the 
interrogations be answered "to convey all information 
that the plaintiffs and plaintiffs' attorney have at their 
disposal regardless of the source" (R 21) ( empasis sup-
plied), no mention of Carter was made until his dramatic 
appearance at the close of the trial. 
It is also clear that Defendants used every legal 
means to avoid such surprise. They asked the names 
of witnesses on Interrogatories. They forced Plaintiff 
to make. full disclosure. They had interviewed or taken 
the deposition of every witness called by Plaintiff except 
the mysterious Carter. What more diligence could have 
32 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
been exercised to avoid just what hapepned 1 
Surprise coming at the close of the trial makes an 
even stronger case for a new trial to remedy the in~ 
justice done thereby. See 
Delmas Fs. ~llartin, 39 Cal 555, quoted with 
approval in TVhitfield vs. Debrincat, 18 Cal. 
Op 2d 730, 64 Pac. 2d 960 at 962. 
That latter case also supports the rule : 
"\Vhere a party has used reasonable diligence 
to ascertain what his witness will testify to and 
has reasonable grounds to believe that the witness 
will testify to a certain state of facts and relies 
upon his doing so, and he does not do so, and the 
case is lost as a consequence, a new trial will be 
granted." 
It is submitted that a corollary to this rule should be: 
"When a party has used reasonable diligence 
to ascertain the identity of the witness and what 
they will testify to and has reasonable grounds 
to believe that there were no other witnesses hid-
ing behind billboards or fishing in streams nearby, 
and relies on that state of facts and the case is 
lost as a consequence thereof, a new trial will be 
granted." 
B. Newly Discovered Evidence. 
Until Carter testified, there was no credible evidence 
placing the car or truck in any other place than the 
photographs and the investigating officers placed them. 
Carter's testimony, if believed, raised a new issue of 
fact. Carter placed the truck and car, when he arrived 
on the scene, from the point on the river where he 
claimed to have been fishing, on the side of the hill around 
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the curve and up· canyon from the location shown in the 
photographs and fixed by the investigating officers ( R 
426-27). 
To support its motion for a new trial, Defendants 
submitted affidavits of Louis Washburn, Burt Nichols, 
and Keith Taggart, who arrived at the scene at about 
the same time or before Carter, as Allen and :Mousley 
were still taking out the injured Mechams from the car 
at their time of arrival, which both Allen and Mousley 
testified, without dispute, was done first. All of these 
proposed witnesses would testify that the vehicles im-
mediately after the accident were at the places shown 
in the photographs and as testified by the investigating 
officers and not as testified by Carter. It is submitted 
that their testimony, if believed, would completely dis-
credit the testimony of Carter and would furnish evidence 
on a point not in issue in the case in chief. As was said 
by this Court in 
Jensen vs. Logan Citv. 89 Utah 347, 57 Pac 2d 
708 at 723. 
"Where disinterested testimony on the vital 
point in a case is very scant, newly discovered 
testimony on that point appearing from affidavits 
in support of the motion for a new trial to be 
apparently reliable, when its appears that the 
movant for the new trial was not guilty of 
indiligence in failing to obtain the witness for 
the trial, and that there is no element of holding 
such witness in reserve for purpose of obtaining 
a new trial - generally picturesquely denomi-
nated in slang phraseology as 'an ace in the hole' 
-and it appears likely that such evidence would 
change the result, a new trial should be- granted. 
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vVhile the granting or refusing of the motion lies 
in the sound discretion of the court, where there 
is grave supsicion that justice may have mis-
carried because of the lack of enlightenment on 
a vital point which new evidence will ·apparently 
supply, and the other elements attendant on ob-
taining a new trial on the ground of newly dis-
covered evidence are present, it would be an abuse 
of sound discretion not to grant the same.". 
Plaintiff sought to answer Defendant's affidavits and 
support of its motion of a new trial by affidavits to the 
effect that Defendants knew or should have known of 
the proposed evidence and the testimony of these witnes-
ses, and because of that fact, Defendants do not meet 
the requirement established by this Court in 
Klopenstine vs. Hays, 20 Utah 45, 57 Pac. 712,-
and reiterated in Trimble vs. Union Pacific 
Stages, 105 Utah 457, 142 Pac 2d 674, 
that to entitle a defeated party to a new trial on 
the ground of newly discovered evidence, it must appear 
that he used reasonable diligence to discover and produce 
at the former trial the newly discovered evidence and 
that his failure to do so was not the result of his own 
negligence. This principle Defendants do not deny. But, 
it is submitted, this case is quite a different situation. 
The proposed evidence is to shed new light on an is~ue 
which was not raised until Carter testified on "rebuttal" 
at the close of the trial.. Certainly if Defendants, by 
pre-trial discovery, had plucked this ace from Plaintiff's 
Counsel's sleeve, they would have been derelict in not 
supplying evidence to meet it of which they knew or 
.should have known, but from all the Plaintiff's witnesses 
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that Defendants were able to discover and interview or 
subject to examination by deposition, there was no issue 
as to the locale of the accident or the vehicles immedi-
ately thereafter. The testimony of Washburn, :Nichols 
and Taggart would have been merely cumulative until 
Carter's testimony was introduced, but after he testified, 
would have tended to make clear a fact as to which ·Car-
ter's testimony may have raised a doubt. See 
Jensen vs. Logan City, Supra. 
It is submitted that the trial court, when acquainted 
with the surprise nature of Carter's testimony, the dili-
gence of Defendants and their Counsel to avoid that 
hazard, and the availability of evidence which would dis-
credit that new issue belatedly raised by Plaintiffs and 
which would conteract the psychological advantage with 
the jury which Plaintiff's tactics gained, should have, 
particularly in view of the physical evidence produced, 
granted a new trial. Only by a new trial can the effect 
on the jury of the last-minute surprise presentation of 
Carter be eliminated. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLU'SION 
Defendants submit that the undisputed physical evi-
dence clearly places the collision in the Allen lane of 
traffic; and that therefore, the conclusion is inescapable 
that Thomas Udell Mecham was negligent as a matter 
of law in being on the wrong side of the road. Further-
more, there was no creditable evidence that Arthur R. 
Allen was negligent in any respect. On the basis of the 
evidence before it, the trial court should not have sub-
mitted to the jury the issue of Defendants' negligence and 
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liability, but should have directed a verdict of no cause 
of action. 
But the trial court compounded that error by in-
structing the jury that Thomas Mecham was presumed 
to be a prudent and careful driver and that the jury was 
to consider that presumption along with the evidence in 
the case. Just how much weight the jury gave this im-
ponderable shadow is not known, but suffice it to say, 
that they were instructed to weigh it is prejudicial error. 
Finally Defendants, already the victims of a mis-
understanding over insurance coverage and the with-
drawal from the defense by the insurance company in 
midstream, became the victims of a surprise· witness 
whose identity and existence was carefully hidden until 
the denouement in the closing moments of the trial cre-
ated the psychological effect on the jury that strategy 
had envisioned. 
On the basis of the foregoing, it is. submitted that 
Defendants are entitled to a reversal of the judgment 
of the Court below. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FABIAN, CLENDENIN, MOFFAT 
AND MABEY, 
PETER W. BILLINGS, 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Appellants 
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